Pre-incorporation contracts: statutory reform by Ncube, Caroline B
PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS: STATUTORY REFORM*
CAROLINE B NCUBE
Lecturer, University of Cape Town
INTRODUCTION
South African company law is undergoing a major two-stage overhaul that
will culminate in the coming into force of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
The first stage was completed with the coming into force of the Corporate
Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2006 on 14 December 2007 (Proc 47 GG 30594
of 14 December 2007) and the second stage will be completed with the
coming into force of the Companies Act, 2008. This Act has been assented to
by the President and was published for information on 9 April 2009 (GN 421
GG 32121 of 9 April 2009). Section 225 of this Act provides that it will come
into force on a dated fixed by the President by proclamation in the Gazette,
which may not be earlier than one year following the date of presidential
assent. The earliest that the Act can come into force is therefore 9 April 2010.
This note examines certain aspects of the regulation of pre-incorporation
contracts contained in s 21 of the Companies Act, 2008, read with the
definition of the term ‘pre-incorporation contract’ contained in s 1. The
policy considerations underlying the current provision regulating this issue
(s 35 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973) and some of the difficulties of
interpretation that section has presented will be considered, with a view to
evaluating whether there is any policy shift evident in s 21, and whether its
provisions represent an improvement on its predecessor. The formulation of
s 21 draws on the provisions of its counterpart in the recently amended New
Zealand Companies Act, 1993, and so consideration will also be given to
those provisions.
This note finds that although the imported provisions relating to
pre-incorporation contracts are based on a more balanced and nuanced
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policy, our importation of these provisions is less than ideal, as it duplicates
problematic provisions which ought to have been avoided. The note
therefore concludes that the proposed reforms relating to pre-incorporation
contracts are in principle commendable, but suffer from some defects which
should have been rectified before enactment.
This note does not purport to be a comprehensive analysis of pre-
incorporation contracts. Rather, it seeks to offer insights on some aspects of
s 21. As a result, several issues fall beyond the scope of this note. Such issues
include an analysis of its provision for shareholder protection, and an
examination of how, if at all, s 21 protects unsophisticated promoters and
regulates the interim period between conclusion of the pre-incorporation
contract and the incorporation of the company.
SECTION 35 OF THE COMPANIES ACT
Pre-incorporation contracts are currently regulated by s 35 of the Compa-
nies Act, which was recently amended by s 8 of the Corporate Laws
Amendment Act. Section 35 now reads:
‘Any contract made in writing by a person professing to act as agent or trustee
for a company not yet incorporated shall be capable of being ratified or adopted
by or otherwise made binding upon and enforceable by such company after it
has been duly incorporated as if it had been duly incorporated at the time when
the contract was made and such contract had been made without its authority:
Provided that the memorandum on its registration contains as an object of such
company the ratification or adoption of or the acquisition of rights and
obligations in respect of such contract, and that such contract, has been lodged
with the Registrar together with the lodgement for registration of the
memorandum and articles of the company.’
This section creates a form of statutory agency by providing for the
ratification by a company after its incorporation of a contract concluded on
its behalf by a person professing to be its agent or trustee before its
incorporation. (See H S Cilliers, M L Benade, J J Henning, J J du Plessis, PA
Delport, L de Koker, J T Pretorius Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 3 ed
(2000) para 5.04 (hereafter Cilliers & Benade); M S Blackman, R D Jooste, G
K Everingham, M Larkin, C H Rademeyer, J L Yeats Commentary on the
Companies Act vol 1 (Revision Service 2007) 4-4–4-13 (hereafter Commen-
tary); Tshepo Mongalo Corporate Law & Corporate Governance: A Global Picture
of Business Undertakings in South Africa (2003) 104–8). At common law this
would not be possible: one cannot act as an agent for a non-existent principal
nor can the principal, once it comes into existence, ratify such acts
retrospectively (Kelner v Baxter [1866] LR 2 CP 174 incorporated into South
African law by McCullogh v Fernwood Estate Ltd 1920 AD 204; Cilliers &
Benade paras 5.02–5.03; Commentary 4-6 and 4-10-1; Wilfred M Estey
‘Pre-incorporation contracts: the fog is finally lifting’ 2000 Canadian Business
LJ 3 at 7; Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd v Van Zyl NO 2007 (1) SA 610 (C) para
38). A pre-incorporation contract can be effectively ratified under s 35
provided the stipulated requirements are met. First, the promoter must
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expressly disclose that he is contracting on behalf of a prospective company,
as ‘trustee’ or ‘agent’. Secondly, the pre-incorporation contract must be
reduced to writing. Thirdly, the memorandum of the company upon
registration must list the ratification of that contract as one of its objects.
Fourthly, the contract must be lodged with the Registrar of Companies
together with the memorandum and articles of association when the
application for the incorporation of the company is made. (Prior to 14
December 2007, two copies of the pre-incorporation contract, one of them
notarized, were required — see s 8 of the Corporate Laws Amendment Act,
2006). Finally, ratification under s 35 by a company with a share capital is
possible only after the company becomes entitled to commence business
(Commentary 4-10-1; Cilliers & Benade paras 5.06–5.11).
The interpretation of this section has proved to be problematic in certain
respects. For example, it is debatable whether a ratified pre-incorporation
contract comes into force retrospectively from the date of its conclusion
(Richard Jooste ‘When do pre-incorporation contracts have retrospective
effect?’ (1989) 106 SALJ 507 at 50; Commentary 4-10-1). Peak Lode Gold
Mining Co Ltd v Union Government 1932 TPD 48 at 51–2 held that
pre-incorporation contracts ratified under s 71, the predecessor to s 35,
could not have retrospective effect. On the other hand, the current general
consensus of academics is that ratified pre-incorporation contracts have
retrospective effect unless the parties agree otherwise (Cilliers & Benade para
5.19; Commentary 4-10–4-11; Mongalo op cit at 108; Maleka Femida Cassim
‘Pre-incorporation contracts: reform of section 35 of the Companies Act’
(2007) 124 SALJ 364 at 387–9; Jooste op cit; Jennifer A Kunst, Piet Delport
& Quintus Vorster (eds) Henochsberg on the Companies Act 5 ed vol 1 (Issue 24)
63–4 (hereafter Henochsberg)). As stated above, the purpose of s 35 is to
overcome the general difficulty of agency at common law, one aspect of
which relates to ratification (Jooste op cit at 508; Cassim op cit at 364).
Therefore, if s 35 is complied with, pre-incorporation contracts ought to
have retrospective effect unless the parties agree otherwise. This makes
ratification in terms of s 35 consistent with ratification at common law. To
argue otherwise would result in inconsistency between s 35 and ratification
at common law (Cilliers & Benade para 5.19; H R Hahlo South African
Company Law through the Cases 6ed (1999) 106).
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Before discussing the proposed reforms it is instructive to consider the
current policy considerations underpinning s 35. This will provide the
backdrop to my assessment as to whether a policy shift is necessary, and if so,
what modifications to s 35 are appropriate under the new company law
dispensation.
It appears that the main aim of s 35 is the protection of the promoter
(Cassim op cit at 368; Henochsberg 62) by providing a mechanism to avoid
personal liability on a pre-incorporation contract. However, such protection
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is at the expense of the third party ‘who bears the full risk of non-ratification’
(Cassim op cit at 368). Section 35 leaves third parties particularly vulnerable
because it does not provide for any obligation of a promoter prior to
ratification or upon non-ratification due to non-incorporation of the
prospective company, or a post-incorporation refusal to ratify the contract by
the company (Henochsberg loc cit). In the present socio-economic context of
post-apartheid South Africa, both government policy and practice encourage
and facilitate increased entrepreneurial activity by historically disadvantaged
and often unsophisticated people. Consequently, to expose third parties to
the risks of s 35 is inequitable (Cassim op cit at 368–9).
The counter-argument to the position just presented would be that
although s 35 does not provide for the liability of promoters, it does offer
some protection for third parties, as it requires a promoter to disclose or
‘profess’ that he represents an unincorporated company. Such disclosure is in
effect a warning to third parties — one which should accordingly place them
on their guard. It alerts them to the need to negotiate with promoters and
thereby secure accountability or liability of the promoter should the
pre-incorporation contract fail. The obvious retort to this argument is that
such a warning does not assist an unsophisticated third party who would not
know how, and perhaps even why, he should ensure the inclusion of a
promoter’s liability clause in a pre-incorporation contract (see Cassim op cit
378 on the third party’s lack of appreciation of the complexities of
pre-incorporation contracts).
Clearly, a policy shift is necessary to achieve a more balanced treatment of
potentially predatory promoters and third parties — possibly unsophisticated
entrepreneurs — who enter into pre-incorporation contracts. Third parties
can be placed in a better starting position by way of clearly stipulated
protection, out of which the parties could then contract if they agreed to do
so. This would ensure that vulnerable third parties are not left to their own
devices in determining the scope and content of the protection for which
they must ask in contracting with promoters. Promoters, who are usually
better-equipped, ought rather to bear such responsibility (Cassim op cit at
368). In striving to achieve a balance in this manner, care must be taken with
the regulation of exemption clauses in pre-incorporation contracts, because
such clauses take away the protection the law has extended to third parties.
Two conflicting policy concerns emerge here, namely freedom of contract
and the protection of third parties (Natasha M Johnson Pre-incorporation
Contracts in Company Law: A Comparative Study (unpublished LLM thesis,
University of the Western Cape, 2000) 183). Promoting freedom of contract
exclusively would mean that it would be left entirely up to the parties to
exclude a promoter’s liability and to enforce all such clauses in all
circumstances. But unsophisticated third parties are unlikely to appreciate
the full import of exemption clauses; therefore the position needs to be
mitigated by factoring in the protection of third parties.
An appropriate way to do this would be to balance freedom of contract
and protection of third parties by enforcing only those exemption clauses
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that are simply and clearly worded (Cassim op cit at 378). This would be in
accordance with the treatment of exemption clauses generally at common
law, which employs strict and narrow construction (Francois du Bois (ed)
Willie’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 811–14; Robert Sharrock
Business Transactions Law 7 ed (2002) 209, citing First National Bank of SA Ltd
v Rosenblum and Another 2001 (4) SA 189 (SCA) and Barnard v Protea Assurance
Co Ltd t/a Protea Assurance 1998 (3) SA 1063 (C); see also Durban’s Water
Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA) at 989 H–I and Drifters
Adventure Tours CC v Hircock 2007 (2) SA 83 (SCA) para 10). This policy is
informed by the need to protect vulnerable third parties from contracting
parties who seek to limit their usual liability at law. The law is wary of such
exclusions of liability because they may be abused to the detriment of third
parties. In view of the already precarious position of third parties entering
into pre-incorporation contracts, they perhaps deserve more protection than
the general common law approach to exemption clauses. Indeed, some
commentators have argued for the creation of standard exemption forms or
clauses that are clearly and simply worded to ensure meaningful third party
protection (Cassim op cit at 378).
THE REFORM OF SECTION 35
Section 1 of the Companies Act, 2008 begins the reform of s 35 with the
following definition of a ‘pre-incorporation contract’:
‘[A]n agreement entered into before the incorporation of a company by a
person who purports to act in the name of, or on behalf of, the company, with
the intention or understanding that the company will be incorporated, and will
thereafter be bound by the agreement.’
This definition is extremely important because it clearly indicates that the
Act only applies when a promoter purports to act as an agent, not as a
principal, when concluding a pre-incorporation contract. Currently, it is not
indisputably clear that s 35 applies to agency situations alone, because it also
refers to ‘professed’ trustees who generally act as principals (Cilliers & Benade
para 5.08; Sentrale Kunsmis Korporasie Bpk (Edms) v NKP Kunsmisverspreiders
(Edms) Bpk 1970 (3) SA 367 (A) at 398B). The implication is that where a
promoter purports to act as a principal, the position will be regulated by the
common law rules of stipulatio alteri. The promoter’s agency status will be
discussed further in a subsequent part of this note.
Formalities
Section 21’s first and most striking departure from s 35 is the omission of the
formal requirements relating to lodgement of the pre-incorporation contract
with the Registrar and listing its ratification as one of the company’s objects
in the memorandum of incorporation (memorandum). The requirement
that pre-incorporation contracts be reduced to writing is retained. The
possible reasons for the retention of this requirement and the omission of the
lodgement and objects clause requirements are discussed in turn below.
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Written pre-incorporation contracts
Section 35 requires, for certainty’s sake, that a pre-incorporation contract
must be reduced to writing before it may be susceptible to ratification. A
written contract is an important component of a company’s records, and
ensures full and accurate disclosure within the company, for example from
promoter to the directors (A J Easson & D A Soberman ‘Pre-incorporation
contracts: common law confusion and statutory complexity’ (1992) 17
Queen’s LJ 414 at 447; Estey op cit at 12 note 34). Section 21 retains this
requirement through subsec 1, which reads (my emphasis):
‘A person may enter into a written agreement in the name of, or purport to act in
the name of, or on behalf of, an entity that is contemplated to be incorporated
in terms of this Act, but does not exist at the time.’
The retention of this requirement is commendable because it is dictated
by the need for certainty and full disclosure.
Stipulation in the objects clause requirement
In so far as it relates to the capacity of a company, the proposed removal of
the s 35 requirement that the ratification of pre-incorporation contracts be
listed as an object in the objects clause of a company’s memorandum is
understandable. Currently, a company has limited capacity and can only
validly do what its memorandum’s objects clause permits it to. Section
19(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2008 proposes to change this by giving
companies the capacity of a natural person as far as it is possible for a juristic
person. A company’s memorandum will therefore not need to state a main
object (Cassim op cit at 394). As a result, there should be no need to list the
ratification of a particular pre-incorporation contract as a specific object of a
company.
However, to the extent that there were any other reasons for the
enactment of this requirement, perhaps there is a need to retain it, albeit not
as an object but simply as a disclosure requirement. Disclosing the ratification
of a pre-incorporation contract in the company’s memorandum and the
lodgement of the relevant pre-incorporation contract serve as an important
protection of outsiders who may wish to extend credit to or invest in the
company (Cassim op cit at 394). Potential creditors or investors intending to
transact with a particular company can determine its pre-incorporation
commercial activities from that company’s memorandum. This enables them
to make informed decisions about whether to transact with or invest in that
company. But the corollary of such potential creditor/investor protection is
that such disclosure requirements are prejudicial to companies, as will be
apparent from the discussion below (Cilliers & Benade 63; Cassim op cit at
394).
The pertinent question therefore is whether the protection that this
requirement purports to offer outweighs the potential prejudice to compa-
nies. In selecting to remove this requirement, Parliament has decided that the
potential prejudice to companies outweighs outsider protection. This
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL260
decision is justifiable because outsider protection can be achieved by other
means. For example, the financial status of some companies may be
ascertained through the perusal of their audited annual financial statements
filed at the Registrar of Companies’ offices upon payment of the prescribed
fees. In other instances, assurances of a company’s liquidity and solvency or
an overview of its commercial undertakings can be requested directly from
that company. If false or inaccurate information is given by a company in
order to induce a third party to enter into a contract, that third party will also
have ordinary contractual remedies upon discovery of the misrepresentation.
Lodging copies of pre-incorporation contracts
The removal of the lodgement formality by the Companies Act, 2008 raises
an interesting related point. Section 8 of the Corporate Laws Amendment
Act, 2006 amended s 35 to remove the formal requirement of the lodgement
of two copies, one notarized, of pre-incorporation contracts. Companies
now only have to lodge ‘the contract’. This seems to be a reference to the
original pre-incorporation contract because, prior to its amendment, s 35
expressly required copies of the pre-incorporation contract. It may be that
one uncertified copy of the relevant pre-incorporation contract would
suffice, but if that is the case the provision should have said so expressly. It is
not clear why this amendment was deemed necessary, as ultimately s 21
removes the lodgement requirement altogether. Modifying a requirement
that will soon be abolished is confusing: affected persons are required to
adapt to new laws which are, in any event, due to be abandoned within three
years of their introduction.
The Corporate Laws Amendment Act was intended to deal with urgent
matters that could not be delayed until the enactment and coming into force
of the new Companies Act. Consequently, the only justification for so
modifying the lodgment requirement prior to its ultimate removal by the
new Companies Act would be that it is currently highly prejudicial or
onerous. This is certainly not the case here, because it is not very onerous to
secure certification of a contract by a notary public. Further, promoters can
resort to other common law methods of securing pre-incorporation
contracts if they consider this requirement onerous.
The removal of the lodgement requirement
The ultimate removal of the lodgement requirement contemplated by the
Companies Act, 2008, is a welcome and overdue development because it is
inequitable to companies and their co-contracting parties alike (Cilliers &
Benade para 5.22). Lodging copies of pre-incorporation contracts robbed
companies and their contractual partners of confidentiality, and possibly
exposed them to unfair practices such as undercutting by competitors
(Cassim op cit at 394). Admittedly, the removal of the lodgement
requirement prioritizes the protection of companies, and the third parties
with whom they enter into pre-incorporation contracts, over the protection
of potential creditors/investors. However, there is no other way to obviate
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the potential prejudice to companies and their contractual partners. By
contrast, as previously stated, there are other ways of acquiring information
for, and protecting potential creditors/investors. In addition, one must
remember that promoters are also subject to fiduciary duties (Cassim loc cit).
Disclosure of promoter’s agency status
Section 35 currently provides for the ratification of a pre-incorporation
contract concluded by a person ‘professing to act as agent or trustee’ of an
unincorporated company. This phrase is not used in s 21. Before assessing the
new formulation in relation to the capacity in which the promoter professes
to act in s 21, it is instructive to comment on the s 35 formulation. To
‘profess’ literally means ‘to declare openly; announce or affirm; avow or
acknowledge’ (Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1) available at http://
dictionary.reference.com/browse/profess, last accessed on 3 June 2009). However,
in the context of s 35 its definition as part of the composite phrase ‘professing
to act as an agent or trustee’ has been problematic. This is due to the
confusion relating to what is meant by the phrase ‘professing to act as a
trustee’. In Sentrale Kunsmis (supra) at 397 Trollip JA stated that it ‘connotes
that, whilst the person declares that he is acting as a trustee, he is in fact or in
law not one’. In other words, Trollip JA was saying that the section applies
only in those circumstances where the promoter is not in fact acting as a
trustee but merely ‘professing’ to act as such. Ultimately, then, the promoter
would in reality be acting as agent. This interpretation has been criticized,
and it has been suggested instead that the section also applies to situations
where the promoter is in fact a trustee. This would mean that the section is
applicable to promoters acting either as agent or trustee/principal (J D Swart
‘Pre-incorporation contracts’ 1977 SACLJ F-36 at F-42; Cilliers & Benade
para 5.08 relying, inter alia, on McCullugh v Fernwood Estate Ltd (supra) at
207; Cassim op cit at 367 and 395; and see also Johnson op cit 24–36). It also
has been pointed out that the word ‘professing’ is an inadequate translation of
the Afrikaans word ‘verklaar’ used in the authentic text and that ‘declares’ is a
more accurate translation (Swart loc cit).
In view of such debates, it is prudent for the Companies Act, 2008 to
attempt to reach a conclusive resolution by reformulating s 35. Section 21(1)
of the Companies Act, 2008 provides (my emphasis):
‘A person may enter into a written agreement in the name of, or purport to act in
the name of, or on behalf of, an entity that is contemplated to be incorporated
in terms of this Act, but does not yet exist at the time.’
Instead of the phrase ‘professing to act as agent or trustee’, s 21 refers to a
person who ‘purports to act in the name of or on behalf of, a company’. It is
noteworthy that instead of using the recommended or suggested words
‘declares’ or ‘states’, s 21 uses the term ‘purport[s]’. Determining its meaning
is essential to an assessment of whether it is an adequate substitution for both
‘professing’ and ‘declares’. When used as a verb, as it is in this case, ‘purport’
means to ‘represent intentionally either expressly or by implication, a certain
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state of affairs or status’ (my emphasis) (Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1),
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/purport, last accessed on 3
June 2009). On the other hand, to ‘declare’ is to make an express statement.
‘Purport’ therefore has a wider meaning than ‘declare’ in that it also refers an
implied representation. One may argue that practically speaking, broadening
the ambit of s 21 in this manner does not add much value given the difficulty
of proving an implied representation by a promoter. However, the mere fact
that an implied representation may be difficult to prove does not mean that it
is impossible. Moreover, proof of an implied representation is ultimately a
question of fact that is dependant on the circumstances of the particular case.
It would therefore be imprudent, on the ground of mere difficulty, to
exclude what could potentially be a useful avenue of redress for a third party.
Therefore it seems that ‘purports’ is an appropriate word to use instead of
‘declares’, as it extends the section to situations where a promoter implies
that he is acting on behalf of, or in the name of, a future company and thus
provides remedies for a class of third parties for whom the law had previously
not catered. It also eliminates the debate about the meaning of ‘profess’.
As previously noted, a reading of s 21 with the s 1 definition of a
pre-incorporation contract leads one to the conclusion that s 21 applies only
in those cases where a promoter has disclosed or implied that he or she is the
agent of an unincorporated company. This is because s 1 provides that a
pre-incorporation contract is concluded in the name of, or on behalf of, an
unincorporated company. Section 21 reinforces this by also providing that
the promoter must purport to contract in the name of, or on behalf of, such a
company. A trustee does not act ‘in the name of, or on behalf of’ another;
rather, a trustee contracts as principal in his own name. Although s 21 applies
only to promoters acting as agent, where a promoter acts as principal it will
still be possible for the company to adopt the relevant pre-incorporation
contract under the common law rules relating to stipulatio alteri (McCullogh
(supra) at 207; Swart op cit at F-42; Johnson op cit at 32).
The exclusion of principals from s 21 is in stark contrast to the position
under s 35. As shown above, s 35 can also be interpreted to apply to
promoters acting as principals. This coverage of trustees or principals is
beneficial to the extent that it provides an additional means of ratification.
The company set to benefit from the pre-incorporation contract is afforded
an additional avenue of ratification by s 35. It can choose to ratify under the
common law or under s 35.
However, s 35 does not regulate the liability of the promoter in any way.
The liability of the promoter acting as trustee or principal is thus determined
in accordance with the contract between the third party and the principal
(Henochsberg 63). The main criticism levelled against s 35 is its failure to
provide for promoter liability, which leaves third parties vulnerable. The
main advantage s 21 has over s 35 is its provision for promoter liability,
which is discussed further below. However, s 21 does not apply to promoters
acting as principals. This is unfortunate because third parties concluding
pre-incorporation contracts with promoters acting as principals do not have
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the same protection as is extended to those who contract with promoters
who act as agents. There does not seem to be a convincing reason for this
distinction. In order to provide uniform third party protection, s 21 should
have included promoters acting as principals.
Repudiation
Section 21(4) grants companies a three-month period after incorporation
within which to ‘completely, partially or conditionally ratify or reject any
pre-incorporation contract’ entered into on their behalf. Section 21(4) has
thus retained the s 35 provision for ‘a positive step of ratification’ (a phrase
used by Cassim op cit at 383) by providing that a company must ratify a
pre-incorporation contract it wishes to perform. Two issues immediately
stand out as noteworthy in the consideration of this section. The first is the
significance of the provision for a three-month period during which a
company is to decide whether or not to ratify a pre-incorporation contract.
Section 35 does not have a similar provision. Generally, companies should
ratify pre-incorporation contracts within the contractually agreed time or, in
the absence of such an agreement, within a reasonable time. However, the
determination of a reasonable time is ultimately made by courts and is
dependent on the facts of each matter. Consequently, those third parties who
are party to pre-incorporation contracts that do not stipulate a time period
for ratification may find their affairs being held in limbo for lengthy periods
of time whilst they wait for a company to decide whether or not to ratify the
pre-incorporation contract in issue. In addition, they may have to resort to
litigation to compel a company to make the decision, which ultimately may
not be made in their favour. Section 21’s modification of the current position
by its provision for a specified period within which companies are to decide
whether to ratify pre-incorporation contracts is in the interests of third
parties and companies. It accords companies a fair amount of time within
which to order their affairs post incorporation and to consider their
pre-incorporation contracts. At the same time, third parties will benefit from
this provision because they will have to wait a maximum of three months for
a company’s decision in this regard.
The second issue is that, like s 35, s 21(4), whilst providing for positive
ratification (or rejection), does not provide for the manner of ratification or
rejection. It is therefore entirely up to a company to determine the manner
of ratification or rejection. In the interests of certainty, it may have been
prudent to provide for a manner of ratification in the same way as do s 53(2)
of the South African Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 and ss 180 and
182(4) of the New Zealand Companies Act.
The Close Corporations Act provides that ratification ‘shall be in the form
of a consent in writing of all the members of the corporation, given within a
time specified in the contract or, if no time is specified, within a reasonable
time after incorporation’ (s 53(2)). The New Zealand Companies Act
provides that ratification be similarly effected in writing by the directors
(ss 180 and 182(4)). Such express provision for the manner of ratification is
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desirable because it increases the level of certainty for all parties involved.
Although neither the Close Corporations Act nor the New Zealand
Companies Act provide for a manner of rejection, it is submitted likewise
that for the sake of completeness the manner of rejection also ought to have
been stipulated in the Companies Act, 2008.
Importantly, s 21(5) provides that if a company fails to ratify or reject a
pre-incorporation contract within the three-month period, it will be
‘regarded to have ratified that agreement’. This section complements s 21(4).
As already stated, s 21(4) grants companies three months within which to
decide whether to ratify or reject a pre-incorporation contract and to take
appropriate action. Section 21(5) then provides for the consequences of a
company’s failure to act within this three-month period by providing for
deemed ratification after the expiry of that period. Currently, both in terms
of s 35 and the common law, there is no deemed ratification of pre-
incorporation contracts. Section 21(5) is thus novel. A number of comments
can be made about the significance of this section.
At first sight, s 21(5) appears almost punitive in nature — companies that
fail to decide on pre-incorporation contracts within the stipulated time do so
on the penalty of being bound by those contracts. However, any apparent
harshness is mitigated by the three-month grace period which companies are
afforded by s 21(4). Secondly, s 21(5) provides necessary protection for third
parties, as it holds lax companies to pre-incorporation contracts. It forces
companies to apply their minds to pre-incorporation contracts and take
appropriate action within three months. Thirdly, the section provides some
relief for promoters in its imposition of secondary liability on companies.
This is because the promoter is freed from liability once the company is
deemed to have ratified the pre-incorporation contract, and the company
thus becomes liable to the third party. Such a transfer of liability from the
promoter to the company is particularly helpful where the failure to make a
decision timeously is not attributable to any fault of the promoter. To
continue to hold the promoter liable in such circumstances would be unfair
to promoters. Sections 21(4) and (5) have equitably balanced the interests of
third parties, companies and promoters, and as such they constitute a marked
improvement on s 35.
Retrospective effect of ratified pre-incorporation contracts
As already mentioned, whether s 35 provides for the retrospective effect of
pre-incorporation contracts is debatable. The Companies Act, 2008 there-
fore attempts to clarify this matter once and for all by means of s 21(6)(a)
which provides (my emphasis):
‘To the extent that a pre-incorporation contract or action has been ratified or
regarded to have been ratified in terms of subsection (5) the agreement is as
enforceable against the company as if the company had been a party to the agreement
when it was made.’
The wording of this provision follows the popular formulation employed
by the legislation in a number of other jurisdictions (see Cassim op cit at
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388). For example, it is quite similar to s 182(3) of the New Zealand
Companies Act, which provides ‘[a] contract that is ratified is as valid and
enforceable as if the company had been a party to the contract when it was
made’. Unfortunately, this formulation has not proved to be problematic
because it does not indisputably provide for retrospective effect (Cassim loc
cit). Scholars have debated the import of such formulations, with some
arguing that it meant ratified pre-incorporation contracts were retrospective
to the date of their conclusion, and others arguing that they are retrospective
to the date of the company’s incorporation. Any reform should therefore use
clear and unambiguous wording to resolve such debates conclusively. I
suggest that the section should read ‘pre-incorporation contracts have
retrospective effect and are binding from the date of their conclusion’. Such
wording would clearly remove any potential for confusion. It would also
ensure that ratification under s 21 corresponds with ratification at common
law as outlined above.
Remedies: promoter and company liability
If the entity on whose behalf a pre-incorporation contract was concluded is
not incorporated, or, if it is incorporated, it repudiates the pre-incorporation
contract, the third party can seek relief against the promoter in terms of
s 21(2). In addition, it seems that s 21(2) extends liability for the failure of a
pre-incorporation contract to persons in addition to, or instead of, a
promoter. It provides (my emphasis):
‘A person who does anything contemplated in subsection (1) is jointly and
severally liable with any other such person for all liabilities created as provided for
in the pre-incorporation contract while so acting, if —
(a) the contemplated entity is not subsequently incorporated; or
(b) after being incorporated, the company rejects any part of such an
agreement or action.’
The first half of the section is a clear reference to promoters acting as
company agents. It is not clear to whom the phrase ‘any other such persons’
in the second half of the section refers. The use of the word ‘such’ suggests
that the identificatory criteria applicable to promoters are also applicable to
these other persons. If they are, then ‘any other such person[s]’ are simply
promoters acting as company agents who, if not legally appointed as such, are
de facto occupying such positions. As already stated in the previous section
on the promoter’s agency status, s 21 in its entirety is applicable only to those
situations where promoters act as agents. This is the clear import of the s 1
definition of pre-incorporation contracts, when read with s 21(1).
The reasons for the inclusion of the reference to ‘any other such person’ in
s 21(2) are unclear. It may have been included to cater for circumstances
where there are two or more promoters, but the pre-incorporation contract
in issue is signed by only one of them. Without this subsection, only the
promoter who executed the contract would be liable. The subsection may
also have been intended to deal with the situation in which there is more
than one promoter, and to provide that instead of such persons being jointly
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liable so that a third party would have to sue each one for their pro rata share
of the liabilities, one of them could be sued as being jointly and severally
liable for the entire amount of those liabilities, leaving that promoter to
recover pro rata shares from the others involved. As already stated, s 21 does
not apply to a promoter acting as trustee. Hence, such promoters could not
be included in this category of ‘any such persons’. As discussed above, this
position is inequitable, since third parties contracting with promoters who as
agents are protected by s 21, whilst those who contract with promoters
acting as principals or trustees are denied the same protection.
Section 21(3) and (6)(b) provides that promoters will be released from
liability where novation or (actual or deemed) ratification occur, respec-
tively. The significance of this provision is that, in addition to novation or
actual ratification, a promoter will also be released from liability when the
company is deemed to have ratified the pre-incorporation contract in issue.
These provisions achieve fair treatment of promoters by releasing them from
liability on the three grounds stated above. Of these three grounds, deemed
ratification is novel. I have commented on it in the part of this note entitled
‘Repudiation’ above. I will also revisit it in a subsequent section entitled
‘Third party protection’ below.
Section 21(7) then provides that a promoter who bears liability after a
company rejects a pre-incorporation contract may lay a claim against the
company concerned for any benefit it has received or is entitled to receive
under the pre-incorporation contract. This section provides protection for a
promoter who finds himself accountable to a third party in circumstances
where the company has received some benefit under a repudiated
pre-incorporation contract. The promoter will, after discharging his liability
to the third party, be able to obtain full or partial reimbursement from the
company under this section. In other words, if a company has rejected a
pre-incorporation contract, it must return any benefit it had acquired under
the contract. These benefits are not defined or more precisely described in
the Act, but it would be reasonable to assume that a company would have to
return the exact goods or services acquired under the pre-incorporation
contract, or, if this is not possible, their value in money. A company that is
unable to return the exact goods or services should thus not be compelled to
ratify the contract, because it has the option of reimbursing the promoter
financially. If a company is unable to pay the monetary equivalent of the
goods or services in question, it may face sequestration. Further, if it is
possible to identify or quantify other benefits related to a pre-incorporation
contract, they would also have to be restored by the company to the
promoter, who would in turn have to restore them to the third party.
The Act rightly requires the return of benefits acquired under a rejected
pre-incorporation contract, for a company would otherwise be unjustifiably
enriched at the expense of the promoter or the third party. However, in
practice compliance with this section will be difficult where the return of
exact goods is sought from the promoter whilst the goods are still in the
possession of the company. In such a scenario it is impossible for the
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promoter first to satisfy the third party’s claim and thereafter to seek recourse
from the company. The promoter simply cannot return the goods to the
third party. The best way for the promoter to proceed would be to seek a
joinder of the company to the litigation or application so that the court can
order the company to return the goods directly to the third party. Another
option is for a promoter to anticipate this situation by seeking the return of
the exact goods from the company as soon as the company rejects the
pre-incorporation contract. This would place the goods in the promoter’s
possession so that he or she is able to meet the third party’s inevitable claim
when it is instituted.
The import of the phrase ‘entitled to receive’ in this section is worthy of
comment. At first glance, it appears to confuse matters: if a company has
rejected a pre-incorporation contract, it has rendered that contract a nullity
and as a result should not be entitled to receive any benefits under it. This
explains why all benefits received under such contract should be returned.
However, the phrase ‘is entitled to receive’ presupposes that such a rejected
contract is still valid. It is thus necessary to consider whether a rejected
contract could ever be treated as valid. Arguably, s 21(2)(b) answers this query
by providing for partial rejection of a pre-incorporation contract. Where a
company has partially rejected the contract it will be entitled to receive some
benefits under the partially rejected contract. The remaining question then is
why such benefits should be returned. Surely there is no need to return those
benefits, as the company would have accepted that part of the pre-
incorporation contract, and would be willing to make payment for them?
Indeed, in some cases the company may already have made payment for that
benefit. I accordingly suggest that this phrase be deleted from s 21(7).
Third party protection
Section 21 of the Companies Act, 2008 protects third parties through the
promoter’s automatic personal liability provided for by s 21(2), and the
deemed ratification provided for by s 21(5).
As already stated, s 21(2) holds a promoter liable under a pre-
incorporation contract if the prospective company is not incorporated, or is
incorporated but rejects the pre-incorporation contract. As argued above in
the section on policy considerations, s 21(2) places third parties in a better
position than s 35 because it provides for clearly stipulated protection.
However, promoters can contract out this position through the use
exclusion clauses. Therefore our courts will have to be very vigilant when
dealing exclusion clauses in this context to ensure adequate protection for
third parties.
Section 21(5)’s provision for deemed ratification has already been
discussed above. This is an important innovation which gives third parties
two significant benefits. First, they only have to wait for a maximum of three
months for companies to decide whether or not to ratify pre-incorporation
contracts. Secondly, they do not have to litigate to hold companies liable on
pre-incorporation contracts where those companies fail to take action in the
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three months period. This avoids the expenses and delays attendant on
litigation which would otherwise deter third parties from enforcing their
rights. Further, promoters also benefit from the provision for deemed
ratification in that they are released from liability when companies fail to
ratify or reject pre-incorporation contracts in the stipulated three-month
period. Finally, companies are also fairly treated as they are given a reasonable
period of three months after incorporation to act before liability is imposed
on them. This section equitably balances the interests of companies, third
parties and promoters.
CONCLUSION
Section 21’s reforms are commendable because they provide better
protection for a third party who enters into a pre-incorporation contract
through the promoter’s personal liability and the company’s deemed
ratification provisions. There clearly has been a policy shift towards a more
balanced and nuanced treatment of third parties. At the same time, promoters
and companies are also equitably treated. However, s 21 has some
deficiencies. For example, it fails to clarify the issue of retrospectivity of
pre-incorporation contracts, because it does not state in express terms that
ratification is retrospective in effect and instead uses a formulation that has
proved to be problematic in New Zealand and other jurisdictions. Secondly,
unlike s 53(2) of the South African Close Corporations Act and s 182(4) of
the New Zealand Companies Act, s 21 does not provide for the manner of
ratification. Thirdly, s 21 does not apply to promoters acting as principals and
thus denies third parties who contract with such promoters the benefit of the
protection it offers.
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